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THE CORPORATION AS MANAGING PARTNER IN A
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
I. INTRODUCTION
The dilemma of the traditional business organizations is the
double taxation that burdens corporations and the unlimited
liability that threatens sole proprietors and general partners in
either a general or limited partnership. The use of a limited
partnership with a corporation as the sole general partner with
limited partners acting as corporate directors, officers, and
stockholders is a unique means of solving the dilemma of the
traditional business organization. A limited partnership with a
corporation as the sole general partner and with limited partners
active in the corporation avoids both the burden of double taxation
and the threat of unlimited personal liability. This hybrid business
organization is a means by which an investor can have an active
role in managing his investment without subjecting himself to
personal liability and double taxation. Significant legal barriers
stand in the way of general acceptance of this hybrid organization
however. This paper will attempt to analyze these legal barriers
while detailing the significant business advantages that accrue from
the use of the hybrid organization.
II. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE HYBRID
ORGANIZATION
The limited partnership managed by a corporate general
partner, with limited partners acting as corporate directors,
officers, and stockholders offers to the investor the advantages of a
greater chance at obtaining needed financing, conduit tax
treatment, and limited liability while retaining an active role in the
limited partnership.
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A. Finance
The corporate general partner may be able to more easily
obtain financing than a non-corporate general partner, because
laws regulating corporate borrowing sometimes impose a higher
ceiling rate than laws regulating lending to individuals. The differ-
ence between the corporate borrowing rate and the individual
borrowing rate may be significant. In Florida, for example, the
ceiling on interest rates for individual borowing is ten percent while
the ceiling for corporations is fifteen percent.1 In Georgia there is
no ceiling on interest rates for loans in excess of $2,500 obtained by
corporations, 2 but individuals cannot borrow at a rate greater than
nine percent. 3 Given this difference, a bank may legally be able to
charge a corporation a higher rate of interest and a corporation
may then be able to acquire needed financing. In a similar
situation, a bank may hesitate to lend to an individual at the legally
dictated lower rate of interest but may be willing to lend to the
corporation because of the greater interest return.
B. Tax
The hybrid organization also offers a significant tax
advantage. 4 The hybrid structure with the corporation as general
partner and the investors as limited partners avoids the double
taxation of the corporate structure. 5 In a limited partnership there
1. FiL.A. STAT. ANN. b87.02 (West Supp. 1978).
2. GA. CODE ANN. § 57-118(1977).
3. Id. 1 57-101 (1977).
4. Sonfield, The Texas Limited Partnership as a Vehicle for Real Estate Investment, 3 ST. MARY'S L. J.
13. 17(1971).
5. Whether a limited partnership with a corporation as the sole general partner will be
determined to be a partnership or an association will be determined by a totality of the circumstances
test. Re%-. Proc. 72-13. 1972-1 C.B. 735. "[A] limited partnership will be treated as an association if.
• . the organization more nearly resembles a corporation than an ordinary partnership or other
business organization." Treas. Reg..§ 301.7701-3 (1979). The major factors that are used to
determine if a limited partnership resembles a corporation are continuity of life. centralization of
management, limited liabilitv, and free transferability of interests. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1979):
Sonfield, supra note 4, at 18-2. The Internal Revenue Service will issue a ruling letter determining
whether the hybrid organization formed will be classified as a partnership rather than a corporation
if the following conditions are met:
[I] if [t)he limited partners Idol • not own . . . more than 20 percent of the stock of
the corporate general partner or any affiliate .... [21 if the corporate general partner
has an interest in only one limited partnership and the total contribution to that
partnership is less than S2.500.000. the net worth of the corporate general partner at
all times will be at least 15 percent of such total contribution or S250.000. whichever is
the lesser: if the total contributions to that partnership are S2,500,000 or more. the net
worth of the corporate general partner at all times will be 10 percent of such total
contributions. . . 131 If the corporate general partner has interests in more than one
limited partnership the net wsorth requirements explained in [2] Nill be applied
separately for each limited partnership, and the corporate general partner will have at
all times .... a niet worth at least as great as the sumn of the total amounts required
under 121 above for eactl separate limited partnership.
[41 For purposes ofcomputing the net worth ofthe corporate general partner in 121 and [31 above, the
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is no taxation at the organizational level. Rather the gain or loss of
the enterprise is passed directly to the investor,6 and the conduit tax
treatment affords the investor tax leverage not available to the
usual corporate investor. This tax leverage often allows the limited
partner to offset substantial gains earned from other income sources
with the substantial depreciation or depletion that is often incurred
by limited partnerships active in such investments as real estate,
oil, and gas.7 Because of this substantial depreciation and depletion
that flows through directly to the limited partner, it is in these types
of business activities that the tax advantages of the hybrid
organization are most apparent and pronounced.
C. Liability
The hybrid organization also offers to the investor the limited
personal liability of the limited partner and the direct involvement
in partnership affairs not found in limited partnerships with an
individual as general partner. By forming a limited partnership
with a corporation as the sole general partner, all persons in the
limited partnership can be effectively shielded from any personal
liability, but the limited partners may continue an active role in the
business of the limited partnership by acting as directors, officers,
and stockholders of the corporation. In the hybrid organization the
limited partners trade the unlimited personal liability of individual
general partnership for the personal liability shield of corporate
stock ownership while continuing an active role in the limited
partnership.8
D. Alternatives
These significant advantages are not entirely exclusive to the
hybrid corporation. To a limited extent some of the advantages
may be attained by the use of other business arrangements. A
subchapter S corporation allows conduit taxation while providing
the protection of limited liability and the avoidance of the restraints
current fair market value must be used. [51 rhe purchase of a limited partnership interest 1) a
limited partner does not entail either a mandatory or discretmonarv purchase or option to purchase
any type of security of the corporate general partner or its affiliate. [61 The organization and
operation of the limited partnership must be in accordance with the applicable state statutes rilating
to limited partnerships. Rev. Proc. 72-13. 1972-1 C.B. 735: Rev. Proc. 74-17. 1974-1 C.B. 438. See
generair Stein. Partnership Taxation for the Limited Partnership with a Corporate General Partner - It Can be
Done. 25 U. oF NItAMI L. R Ev. 435. 436-40 (1971 ): Comment. The Limited Partnership ivtth a Corporate
General Partner - Federal Taxation - Partnership or Association, 24 Sw. L.J. 285 (1970).
6. Sonfield. supra note 4. at 17.
7. Id. at 17: Comment. supra note 5. at 286.
8. Stein. supra note 5. at 435.
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on individual borrowing. A subchapter S corporation is a tax
election. It is limited primarily, because it is restricted to
corporations owned by no more than fifteen shareholders. 9
A second alternative to the hybrid is to place the ownership of
the limited partnership in the name of the spouse. The legal effect
of putting the limited partnership in the name of the spouse is to
separate the limited partnership ownership from the active control
of the corporation. The practical effect is to have both the
ownership and control in one family unit. One limitation on this
alternative is the possible consequences of divorce. Marriages like
partnerships have a tendency to suffer discord and dissolution.
A final alternative is to be employed by the corporate general
partner at as high a salary as is possible. t 0 This alternative avoids
the double taxation on the corporate investment, because salaries
are a deductible business expense for the corporation. However, no
advantage can be taken of depreciation incurred by the partnership
entity. Depreciation deductions are not passed through to the
corporate employees.
Because of the limitations on each of the possible alternatives,
each is basically inadequate. The hybrid limited partnership is a
less limited means by which an investor can have an active role in
managing his investment without subjecting himself to personal
liability or double taxation on his investment.
III. THE LEGAL BARRIERS
Corporations and limited partnerships historically developed
as legally distinct and separate areas of the law. Both the Greeks
and the Romans are known to have made use of the corporate
association."t Limited partnerships existed in France and Italy in
the Middle Ages. 12 Growing from these beginnings came the idea
9. I.R.C. §§ 1371-72 (1979).
10. Hamilton, Corporations, 30 Sw. L.J. 153, 156 (1976).
11. The ancient Greeks are known to have formed corporations as early as the time of Solon
(635-558 B.C.). The only limitation on these Greek associations was that their purpose not be in
conflict with general law. J. KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 269 (1896). The Romans
were introduced to corporations by Numa Pompilius, the second king of Rome (715-672 B.C.).
Pompilius sought to break two large factions of Rome into less politically dangerous smaller factions.
Every trade and profession was broken down into smaller societies (corporations). W. BLACKSTONE,
COMM NTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 468-69 Volume 1 (1897).
12. The beginnings of the limited partnership organization were described in Ames v. Downing,
I Brad. 327 (N.Y. 1850).
The system of limited partnerships, which was introduced by statute into this State.
and subsequently very generally adopted in many other States of the Union, was
borrowed from the French Code. (3 Kent. 36: Codede Commerce. 19, 23. 24). Under the
name of la Societe en commandite, it has existed in France from the time of the middle
ages: mention being made of it in the most ancient commercial records, and in the
earlv mercantile regulations of Marseilles and Montpelier. In the vulgar Latinitv of
the middle ages it was styled commenda, and in Italy accomenda. In the statutes of Pisa
274
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that corporations and partnerships were distinct business entities
not to be entangled.
Arising out of these distinct and separate beginnings
developed two basic theories which, absent statutory authority to
the contrary, barred corporations from becoming partners.
A. Wrongfull Delegation
The first traditional bar to corporate partnership was the
argument that by entering into a partnership a corporation
wrongfully delegated the power of its directors.13 The argument
was based upon the ability of one partner in a partnership to bind
the other. Thus if a corporation were allowed to be a partner, the
corporation could be bound by actions of the noncorporate partner.
This power of the noncorporate partner to bind the corporation was
thought to be hostile to the responsibility of the board of directors.
It was their exclusive duty to manage the corporation. The power
of the noncorporate partner to bind the corporation was too great
an abdiction of the board of directors' power. That abdiction would
deprive the corporate stockholders of their corporate control.' 4
Stockholders control a corporation only through their election of
directors, and the elected directors remain obligated to the
stockholders by their fiduciary relationship. 15 A partner's ability to
bind the corporation was thus seen as a breakdown in the
stockholder's ability to control his investment.
Mallory v. Hananer Oil Works 16 was a leading case stating the
wrongful delegation argument. In Mallory the court stated that
and Florence, it is recognized so far back as the year 1160: also in the ordinance of
Louis-le-Hutin, of 1315; the statutes of Marseilles. 1253: of Geneva, of 1588. In the
middle ages it was one of the most frequent combinations of trade, and was the basis of
the active and widely extended commerce of the opulent maritime activities of Italy. It
contributed largely to the support of the great and prosperous trade carried on aiong
the shores of the Mediterranean, was known in Languedoc, Provence, and Lombardy,
entered into most of the industrial occupations and pursuits of the age, and even
travelled under the protection of the arms of the Crusaders to the city ofJerusalem. At
a period when capital was in the hands of the nobles and clergy, who from pride of
caste, or canonical regulations. could not engage directly in trade, it afforded the
means of secretly embarking in commercial enterprises, and reaping the profits of such
lucrative pursuits, without personal risk: and thus the vast wealth, which otherwise
would have lain dormant in the coffers ofthe rich, became the foundation. by means of
this ingenious idea, of that great commerce which made princes of the merchants.
elevated the trading classes, and brought the Commons into position as an influential
estate in the commonwealth.
Id. at 329-30.
13. H. BALLANTINE. BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 87 (rev. ed. 1946).
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. 86 Tenn. 598.8 S.W. 396(1888).
275
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if a corporation be a member of a partnership, it may be
bound by any other member of the association, and in so
doing he would act, not as an officer or agent of the
corporation; and by virtue of authority received from it,
but as a principal in an association in which all are equal,
and each capable of binding the society by his acts. The
whole policy of the law creating and regulating
corporations looks to the exclusive management of the
affairs of each corporation by the officer provided or
authorized by its charter. The management must be
separate and exclusive, and any arrangement by which
the control of the affairs of the corporation should be
taken from its stockholders and the authorized officers
and agents of the corporation, would be hostile to the
policy of our general incorporation acts.17
B. Unforeseen Liabilities
The unforeseen liabilities that the corporation could incur
because of its partnership involvement is the focus of the second
traditional argument stated as preventing corporations from
becoming general partners. A corporate partner, it was argued,
would be liable to risks to its assets not contemplated by the
stockholders at the time of investment because of the power of the
non-corporate partner to bind the corporation. 18 Whittenton Mills v.
Upton 9 is a leading case standing for the rule that the directors of
the corporation must have the exclusive power to "contract the
debt" of the corporation.
20
C. Breakdown of Barriers
Despite the widespread acceptance of these arguments barring
corporate partners, the rule against corporate partners was never
absolute. The rule was not applied whenever the rationale behind
the rule was found not to apply. Thus corporate partnerships were
upheld whenever a statute or the corporate charter empowered the
corporation to be a partner.2 1 It was reasoned that if a statute or the
corporate charter empowered the corporation to be a partner, there
was notice to the stockholder at the time of his investment that the
17. Mallory %-. Hananer Oil \works. 86 Tenn. 598. 604-05.8 S.\. 396. 399 (1888).
18. Annot . 60A.L.R.2d 917. 930 (1958).
19. 76 Mass. (10 Grav),582(1858).




corporation might enter into a partnership, and the stockholder
could not then argue that his investment was subject to unforeseen
liabilities or that there was wrongful delegation.
The rationale behind the rule barring corporate partners also
did not apply when the corporate partner reserved all management
powers. 22  Where all management powers were reserved a
corporation was allowed to be a partner, because the corporation,
although sharing profits, had not abdicated any directorial control
nor could its partner risk any corporate assets.
Similarly many courts excepted mining corporations from the
rule barring corporate partnerships, because in a mining
partnership there are constraints on the ability of one partner to
bind the other. 23 Mining partnerships are allowed to bind the
partnership only if the agreement has "a direct connection with the
development of the mining venture which is the subject of the
partnership." ,24 This limitation on the power of one mining partner
to bind the other apparently resulted from the free transferability of
a mining partner's interest in the partnership. A mining partner
may freely transfer his interest in the partnership without the
consent of the other partners. Neither does the death of one partner
dissolve the partnership. Since a mining partner could freely
transfer his interest the restraint on liability was imposed. Because
of this liability restraint resulting from the unique nature of mining
partnerships, mining partnerships were excluded from the
prohibition against corporate partners.
25
The carving of exceptions to the traditional rules ended in
many states with the enactment of statutes specifically empowering
corporations to be partners.2 6 The passage of these statutes was
22. R. STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 57 (2d ed. 1949).
23. Id.
24. Strum v. Ulrich, 10 F.2d 9. 12 (8th Cir. 1925).
25. See id.
26. The following states have statutes specifically empowering a corporation to he a general
partner: ALA. CODE tit. 10 § 2-163 (1975): ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.009.18 (1968): ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. S 10-004.A.15 (1977): ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-104.B.6 (1966): CAL. CORP. Cor)n § 207.h (West
Supp. 1978): CoL~o. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101.1.1(r) (1973): DEi-. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 122.11 (1974): FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 607.011(n) (West 1977): GA. CODF ANN.. 22-202(h) (10) (1977): IDAHO CODE § 30-
114.2.1 (1967): IND. CODE ANN. 23-1-2-2.b(14) (Burns Supp. 1978): IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.4.18
(West Supp. 1978-1979): KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6102.11 (1974): K%. Riv. STT. ANN.
271A.020.16 (Supp. 1978): MF. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A . 202.1.Q (W:st. 1964): MnI. CORP. &
ASS'NS. CODE ANN. § 2-103.12 (1975): MICH. CoMP. I.A\s ANN. § 450.1261 .n (1973): MINN. STT.
ANN. § 301.09(8) (West Supp. 1978): Mo. ANN. S TA. § 351.385.5 (Vernon 1966): NEB. RFv. STAT.
ANN. § 21.2004.17 (1977): N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.. 305.2(3) (Supp. 1977): N.. Sisr AN. §
14A:3-1 .1(m) (West Supp. 1978-1979): N.M . St'.. ANN. § 53-11-4.Q (1978): N.Y. Bcs, CoRP.
LAW 2 02.a(15) (NhcKinney 1963): Omto Rs'.. Coner AN-. § 1701.13(F) (4) (1978): Ok.. Rt .
STAT. 57.030(17) (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1302.18 (Purdon 1967); R.IGEN. LAWS ANN. §
7-1.1-4.q (1969): S.C. CODE ANN. 33-3-20.a(16) (1976):TENN. CODE ANN. 48-402.1 (Supp. 1978):
TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.02.A. 18 (Vernon SupI. 1978-1979): VT. STA.sT ANN. tit. 11 §1852.8
(1973): VA. CODE §13.1;2.1 (1978): \V. VA. ConFo § 31-1-8.1) (1975): W'IS. STAT. ANN.. 180.04(14)
(West Supp. 1978-1979): XV\'o. ST..T ANN. § 17-1-104.a(xix) (t77). Of the remairiing states onl\,
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both a recognition that the rule forbidding corporate partners was
largely being devoured by the exceptions and a reflection of the
modern, legal thought that the traditional arguments justifying the
prohibition of corporate partners were no longer persuasive.
Aside from the exceptions detailed above where the rationale
of the rule forbidding corporate partners was found not to apply,
many times the rule was avoided by a finding that a corporation
had only entered into a joint venture rather than a partnership. 27 A
corporation could legally enter into a joint venture for purposes
otherwise empowered by the corporate charter. By entering into a
joint venture, one joint adventurer does not gain control over the
other. Rather, a joint venture is a combining of resources to carry
out a single business enterprise for profit. A joint venture is limited
in scope and duration. 2' The courts often found a joint venture
rather than a partnership when it was desired to avoid the harsher
effects of striking down the enterprise as a "partnership, ,29 but the
result was a dilution of the strength of the rule forbidding corporate
partners.
The prohibition against corporate partners can be attacked
head on as well as eroded by exceptions. In response to the
wrongful delegation argument, it can be argued that a corporation
must delegate power to act. A corporation can act only by
delegating power and responsibility to its agents. A partnership is
nothing more than a mutual agency. In entering into a partnership,
a corporation is really merely appointing an agent to act on its
behalf just as a corporation appoints any one of its employees or
officers to act on its behalf.30 There is in effect then no "wrongful
delegation."
The argument that focuses on the unforeseen liabilities that
could be incurrcd by the corporation because of the partner is
refuted by the recognition that the partner can bind the partnership
only when acting to carry out the usual business of the
partnership. 31 If the partner acts outside the apparent usual course
of business, the partnership will not be liable for the partner's
acts. 32 This restraint on the ability of one partner to bind the other
Nevada and Utah do not have stattes that are similar or comparable to Section 4(g) of the Model
Busittess Corporation Act which has been construed to empower corporations to be general partners.
27. So' Houston \. Dexter & Carpenter. 300 F. 354 (E. D. Va. 1924). modified. 20 F.2d 647 (4th
Cir. 1927): Luhrig Collieries Co v. Interstate Coal & Dock Co.. 281 F. 265. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
28. H. HENN, H DBOOK OF THF. LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 49 (2d ed. 1970).
29. See Houston \'. Dexter & Carpenter. 300 F. 354 (E.D. Va. 1924). modified. 20 F.2d 647 (4th
Cir. 1927): Luhrig Collieries Co. v. Interstate Coal& Dock Co.. 281 F. 265. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).





refutes the unforeseen liability argument, because the usual
business of the partnership is consistent with the interest of the
corporation.33  The corporation will not prosper unless the
partnership does, and thus the interests of the corporation and
partnership are the same. Both have an interest in making a profit.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYBRID
Many of the statutes that were enacted to empower the corp-
oration to be a partner were modeled after or are comparable to
Section 4 (p) of the Model Business Corporations Act 34 and
specifically state that corporations may be partners. 3
5 Other states36
have passed only the more nebulous Section 4(g). 37 A sizeable
minority of states specifically empower corporations to be members
of limited partnerships however. 38 Where a state statute specifically
empowers corporations to be members of limited partnerships there
is no question that a corporation can be a limited partner or a
general partner in a limited partnership. However, where
corporations are only empowered to be partners under section 4(p)
or 4 (g) of the M. B. C. A., a question of legislative intent arises.
33.6 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1171, 1172 (1975).
34. The following states have statutes identical or similar to the Model Business Corporation
Act § 4(p): ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-004.A.15 (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.011 (n)(West 1977);
IDAHO CODE 5 30-114.2.1 (1967); INn. CODE ANN. § 23-1-2-2.b(14) (Burns Supp. 1978); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 271A.020.16 (Supp. 1978); MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns. CODE ANN. § 2-10.12 (1975); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 53-11-4.Q(1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 202.a(15) (McKinnev 1963); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.13(F) (4) (1978); ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.030(17) (1977): PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1302.18 (Purdon 1967); R.IGEN. *LAWS ANN. § 7-1.1-4.Q (1969); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.02.
A.18 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979); W. VA. CODE 5 31-1-8.p (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN.
180.04(14) (West Supp. 1978-1979).
35. "Each corporation shall have power: ....
(p) To be a promoter, partner, memoer, associate, or manager of any partnership,
joint venture, trust or other enterprise."
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 4 (p). North Dakota has not adopted this paragraph into its code.
36. The following states have statutes identical or similar to Section 4(g) of the Model Business
Corporation Act but have not enacted a statute identical or similar to Section 4(p) nor do they
specifically authorize a corporation to be a limited partner: Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Utah, Washington.
37. Each corporation shall have power: ....
(g) To purchase, take, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise acquire, own, hold, vote,
use, employ, sell, mortgage, lend, pledge, or otherwise dispose of, and otherwise use
and deal in and with, shares or other interests in, or obligations of, other domestic or
foreign corporations, associations, partnerships or individuals, or direct or indirect
obligations of the United States or of any other government, state, territory,
governmental district or municipality or ofany instrumentality thereof.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 4(g) (emphasis added). North Dakota has adopted a paragraph identical in
substance. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-04 (1976).
38. ALA. CODE tit. 10 S 2-163 (1975): ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.009.18 (1968): ARK. STAT. ANN.
64-104.B.6 (1966); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101.1.1(r) (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 122.11
(1974) FLA. STAT. AN,. § 607.011(n) (West 1977): IOWA CODE ANN. 5 496A.4.18 (West Supp.
1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6102.11 (1974): MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1261.n (1973); MINN
STAT. ANN. § 301.09(18) (Supp. West 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.385.5 (Vernon 1966); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 21.2004.17 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 305.2(3) (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:3-1. 1(m)(West Supp. 1978-1979); WYO. STAT. ANN. S 17-1-104.a(xix) (197 7 ).
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Did the legislature intend to empower corporations to be members
of limited as well as general partnerships? An indication of that
intent can be determined by assessing the validity of the traditional
arguments barring corporations from becoming members of
general partnerships as they apply to limited partnerships with a
corporate limited or general partner.
A. Corporate Limited Partners
A strong argument supports corporate limited partners. A
limited partner is liable only to the extent of his contribution to the
limited partnership. 39 The limited partner is not personally liable
beyond the extent of that contribution, but in exchange for that
limited liability the limited partner is precluded from taking part in
the control of the business of the limited partnership. 40 Thus if a
corporation is a limited partner the only control on its assets
relinquished by the corporation is the investment in the limited
partnership. The remainder of the corporate assets would remain
under the direction and control of the corporate officers and
directors. There has been then no significant delegation of the
powers of the directors and officers of the corporation. The
directors or officers in choosing to invest in the limited partnership
have exercised their function to guide corporate development. The
powers of the board of directors have not been wrongfully-
delegated. Rather the corporate directors have made a very
ordinary business decision to invest a certain amount of corporate
assets subject to some possible risk. In no event will the risk to the
corporation exceed the total value of the assets invested in the
limited partnership.
The court in Port Arthur Trust Co. v. Muldrow41 argued that the
rule barring corporate general partners was inapplicable to the
situation where the corporation was a limited partner. The w-
rongful delegation argument was held not to apply, because none of
the assets of the corporation had been invested in the limited
partnership. Rather only the trusts which the corporation was
charged with were invested in the limited partnership. The
unforeseen liabilities argument was inapplicable, because none of
the corporate assets were subject to partnership risk. Neither were
they subject to any direction other than from corporate officers and
directors .42
J9. See UNIFORm LIMITED P\RTNERSHIP' ACT (U.L.A.) §§ 7, 17 (1969).
40. Id. 7.
41. Tex. . 291 S.\V.2d 312 (1956).
42. Port Arthur Trust Co. v. M uldrow. - Tex . .... 291 S.W.2d 312. 314 (1956).
280
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The court in Muldrow made a statutory argument to justify
allowing a corporation to be a limited partner. The court asserted
that generally the use of the term "person" in a statute was
construed as including corporations, absent a contrary indication.
In trying to determine whether a corporation was a "person"
empowered to be a limited partner, no contrary indication was
found. A limited partnership is defined simply as a "partnership
formed by two or more persons," 43 and no provision in the U. L.
P. A. excludes a corporation as a person.
44
B. Corporate General Partners in a Limited Partnership
Many of the same arguments that justify a corporate limited
partner also apply to the sole corporate, general partner in a limited
partnership. A corporation acting as sole general partner does not
delegate any directorial powers nor are any corporate assets subject
to any unforeseen risks. The limited partners cannot incur
liabilities against the corporate assets, because they have
relinquished all control in the limited partnership. 45 Clearly the
sole, general, corporate partner in a limited partnership is but a
variation on the long accepted exception to the traditional rule
against corporate general partnership where the corporation,
although a general partner, reserved all management powers of the
partnership.
This argument for corporations as sole general partners is
buttressed by the reasoning that the dangers in terms of the
traditional rules barring corporate partnerships are, as has been
shown, substantially less in a limited partnership with a corporate,
general partner than in a general partnership. Logically then, if the
legislature has empowered corporations to be partners in general
partnerships, then sole, corporate, general partners in a limited
partnership should be permissible.
4 6
A statutory argument for corporate, general partners in a
limited partnership relies on the interrelationship of the Uniform
Partnership Act and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act. Section
2 of the U. P. A. defines "persons" as including corporations. A
limited partnership is defined as being "formed by two or more p-
43. UNIFORM L\I MrED PARTNERSHIP ACT (U. I.A.) § i (1969).
44.- Tex. at-. 291 S.W.2d at 315.
45. See UNIFoR., LIMITEFD PARTNERSHIP ACT (U.L. A.) § 22 (1969).
46. Kitchell Corp. v. Hermansen. 8 Ariz. 424. -, 446 P.2d 934,936 (1968).
47. UNIFORXm LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT (U.L.A.) § 1 (1969).
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ersons, '' 7 but "persons" is never defined in the U. L. P. A.
Lacking a U. L. P. A. definition of person, the U. P. A. definition
is applied as provided by U. P. A. §6(a): "This act shall apply to
limited partnerships except insofar as the statutes relating to such
partnerships are inconsistent therewith." Absent any inconsistent
statute the U. P. A. and U. L. P. A. clearly do not bar and may be
construed as empowering corporate, limited partnership involvem-
ent.
48
One section of the U. L. P. A. can be construed to be
inconsistent with the U. P. A. Section 21 of the U. L. P. A. refers
to the effect of the "retirement, death, or insanity" of a general
partner. This section can by implication preclude a corporate
general partner. A corporation is by definition eternal and sane.
This section gives some indication that corporations were not
intended to be general partners. 49 It is quite likely though that
corporations were never meant to be barred from limited
partnerships, but rather the advantages resulting from the use of
corporate general partners were probably just not foreseen when
the U. L. P. A. was drafted.
50
The policy argument that stresses a need for someone to be
personally liable in limited partnerships is also expressed as a bar to
corporate general partners in limited partnerships. The policy
argument stresses that a nominally capitalized corporation could
evade the liability imposed upon general partners by the U. L. P.
A. 5 1 However, the power to pierce the corporate veil may be
exercised by the courts where there is inadequate initial financing
or where the financial resources of the corporation are drained off
to the detriment of the creditors. 52 If the corporate veil is pierced
and the corporate entity disregarded, the individual stockholders
become personally liable. 53 By disregarding the corporate entity
only when there has been inadequate capitalization, the tax,
financial, and limited liability advantages of the hybrid
organization would be available to those willing to adequately
finance their corporations.
48. 8 Ariz. 424, 446 P.2d 934 (1968); -Tex. -. 291 S.W.2d 312 (1956); Frigidaire Sales Corp.
v. Union Properties, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 400. 562 P.2d 244 (1977).
49. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease, Ltd.. 517 S.W.2d 420, 426 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974) (Presler, C.J.,
dissenting) rev'd in part, 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex, 1975).
50. Hamilton, supra note 10, 157-8.
51. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease, Ltd.. 526 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex. 1975).
52. Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties. Inc.. 88 Wash. 2d 400, _, 562 P.2d 244, 247
(1977).
53. Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823. 830 (5th Cir. 1959). rehearing denied, 274
F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1960). cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960): Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, 21 F.2d
720. 724 (8th Cir. 1927).
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C. The Hybrid and the Control Test
All of the advantages of the hybrid organization accrue only
when the limited partners are also officers, directors, and
shareholders of the corporate general partner. Whether those
limited partners active in the corporation are protected by the
corporate fiction from personal liability imposed by the "control"
test of section 7 of the U. L. P. A. is in question however. The
control test provides that any limited partner who acts to control
the business of the limited partnership is liable as a general partner.
The courts must accept that a limited partner while acting in a
corporate capacity is not also a limited partner controlling the
partnership if the limited partner is not to be held generally liable.
The acts for the corporation must be distinguished from the acts in
the capacity of limited partner. The Texas court in Delaney v.
Fidelity Lease Limited would not accept the corporate fiction. 54 The
court adopted a part of the dissent of the lower court which found
it difficult to separate the [defendants'] acts for they were
at all times in the dual capacity of limited partners and
officers of the corporation. Apparently the corporation
had no function except to operate the limited partnership
and [the defendants] were obligated to their other
partners to so operate the corporation as to the benefit of
the partnerships. Each act was done then, not for the
corporation, but for the partnership. Indirectly, if not
directly, they were exercising control over the
partnership. Truly the corporate fiction was in this
instance a fiction. 55
There is reason to respect the corporate fiction as applied to
limited partners however. There is arguably no conflict of interest
between the corporation and the limited partnership. Both have an
interest in a profitable limited partnership. The Washington Court
of Appeals has recognized that there is "no inherent wrong ' ' 56 in
that dual relationship and that "dual capacities are not inimical. "5
Indeed, courts should have no less trouble accepting the corporate
fiction when limited partners are active in the corporation then
54. 526 S. -. 2d at 541".
55. Id at 545.
56. Frigidaire Sales Corp. x. Union Properties. Inc.. Wash. App. - 544 P.2d 781. 784 (1976).
aff'd. 88 Wash. 2d 400. 562 P.2d 244 (1977).
5 7.d.
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when two persons operate a business by way of a close corporation.
It is argued, however, that the corporate fiction in this case
acts to circumvent the control test, and a court should disregard the
corporate fiction when the corporate form is used to circumvent a
statute. 58 The hybrid with the limited partners active in the
corporation does circumvent the control test statute as it reads on
its face but the corporation is a statutory creature. It is designed to
avoid personal liability.5 9 The statutory control test then is in
seeming conflict with the statutory corporate scheme designed by
legislatures to avoid the personal liability that the control test would
impose. When two statutes are in conflict they are to be construed
as being consistent with each other if possible. 60 The statutory
control test and the statutory scheme creating corporations can be
construed as being consistent with each other if the corporate entity
is respected when a limited partner is active in the corporate
general partner. The control test should not be applied blindly with
no regard to its purpose. When the limited partner conscientiously
keeps his actions in his corporate capacity separate and distinct
from his actions within his capacity as limited partner and where
the corporation is known to be the general partner, no injustice is
committed by respecting and not piercing the corporate veil.
The purpose of the control test is to "prevent third parties
from mistakenly assuming that the limited partner is a general
partner and to rely on his general liability. ,,61 The control test thus
may be construed as implicitly containing a reliance requirement.
The Washington court in Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties,
Inc. 62 recognized such a reliance component in the control test. The
limited partners active in the corporate, general partner had
''conscientiously kept the affairs of the corporation separate from
their personal affairs, and no fraud or manifest injustice [was]
perpetrated upon third parties who [dealt] with the corporation.
The corporation's separate entity should be respected. ' 63 The
court found that no reliance had been placed upon the personal
liability of the limited partners.
Similarly in Western Camps v. Riverway Ranch Enterprise, 64 one of
the limited partners who was also an officer, director, and
shareholder of the corporate, general partner, negotiated a
58. 526 S.W.2d at ,)46.
59. Ranex v. Koons. 230 F.2d 802, 806 (5th Cir. 1956): Elenkrieg \. Siebrecht,. 238 N.Y. 254.
144 N.E. 519(1924): Buckner v. Dillard. 184 Okla. 586. 89 P.2d 326 (1939).
60. Thornton \. Anderson. 207 Ga. 714. 64 S.E.2d 186. 188-89 (1951).
61. 517 S.\.2d 420, 425 (Ct. App. 1974) re'dmin part. 526 8.\V.2d 543 (Tex. 1975).
62.88 \Wash. 2d 400. 562 P.2d 244(1977).
63.88 Wash. 2d at . 562 P.2d at 247.
64.70 Cal. App. 3d 714. 138 Cal. Rptr. 918(Ct. App. 1977).
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sublease. In considering the "control" test the court pointed out
that the limited partner had intended to act only within the
corporate entity and that the creditor was fully aware that the
corporation was the general partner of the limited partnership. The
court accepted the argument that the limited partner was at all
times "acting with his capacity as agent of the corporate general
partner, not in his capacity as a limited partner. "65 Since the
limited partner acted only within the corporate entity and because
the creditor was fully aware that the corporation was the general
partner no reliance was placed on the limited partner's personal
liability. Finding no reliance, there was no valid reason for
imposing personal liability upon the limited partner.
There is no actual mention of a reliance requirement in the
control test. If a court applies the control test strictly without
examining its purpose, then any limited partner who has been
active in the limited partnership will be held personally liable. The
limited partner will be personally liable even though he always
acted within his corporate capacity and the creditors knew that the
general partner was a corporation. The limited partner will be
personally liable despite the lack of any possible reliance on his
personal liability, because the court finds no explicit requirement of
reliance in the wording of the control test.
66
As long as the limited partners act within their corporate
capacities and the business dealings are voluntary and without
deception, there seems to be little reason to apply the control test
without the implied reliance requirement. A creditor dealing with a
corporation knows that he cannot look to the personal liability of
the corporate agents if the corporation is unable to cover its
liabilities. The creditor knows that he assumes the risk of loss if the
corporation is unable to meet its liabilities. However, the creditor
always has the option of getting a personal guarantee from someone
in the corporation before dealing with the corporation if the
corporation's financial situtation is questionable. There is no
logical reason for a creditor who knows he is dealing with a
corporation that is the general partner of a limited partnership to be
able to look to the corporate agents' personal liabilities just because
those corporate agents are also limited partners. 67 There is then no
valid justification to pierce the corporate veil of the corporate
65. Western Camps, Inc., v. Riverwav Ranch Enterprises, 70 Cal. App. 3rd 714, - 138 Cal.
Rptr. 918. 926 (Ct. App. 1977).
66. 526 S.W.2d at 545.
67. 562 P.2d at 247.
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general partner when the creditor has knowingly and voluntarily
dealt with the corporate general partner, and the parties have
allocated the risks by their agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
The limited partnership with a corporate, general partner
owned and managed by the limited partners offers the unique
advantages of limited liability, conduit taxation, and active control
over the investment. The hybrid business organization has evolved
out of an increasing judicial and legislative acceptance of corporate
involvement in partnerships. The thrust for change came from
businessmen seeking to avoid taxes and insulate themselves from
personal liability. Legislative action has abolished the traditional
barriers to corporate partners represented by the arguments that a
corporation in a partnership wrongfully delegated to the partner
powers that were the exclusive duty of the board of directors to ex-
ercise and wrongfully subjected corporate assets to risks not
contemplated by the stockholders at the time of their investment.
Despite the abolition of the traditional arguments by statute,
the control test of section 7 of the U. L. P. A. remains as a present
threat to the limited partner active in the corporate, general partner
of a limited partnership. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Limited68 and
Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc. 69 are the landmark
cases delineating the present conflict in the courts over the
acceptance of the corporate general partner as a shield from the
general liability the control test would impose. These two cases-take
opposing approaches in reading and applying the control test. In
Delaney a plain meaning reading was adopted. In Frigidaire an
implied reliance requirement was read into the control test.
In the long run it will probably be the state legislature and not
the courts that finally determine if the hybrid will be acceptable. A
revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act was drafted in 1976, and
that revision added a definitions section. That definitions section
includes "corporations" within its definition of persons that can be
general and limited partners. 70 The revision also itemizes a number
of things that will not be considered as taking part in the control of
the business. These "safeharbor" provisions include a provision
for agents and employees of the limited or general partners.71 The
68. 517 S.W .2d 420. rev 'din part. 526 S.\V.2d 543 (TCx. 1975).
69. 88 Wash. 2d 400. 562 P.2d 244(1977).
70. UNIFORM LIIITED PA\RT\F.Rs-II' AcT(U.L.A.) 101 (197 6 ).7 1. Id. 3 0:3.
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effect of this revision is to allow corporations to be general or
limited partners with no danger of personal liability for the limited
partners just because they are agents or employees of the corporate
general partner.
The revision reflects the better view of the validity of the
hybrid organization. Upholding the corporate entity of the hybrid
results in no injustice as long as the corporate agents have
manifested that their acts are in their capacities as agents for the
corporation and there has been no justifiable reliance on their
personal liability.
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